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________________________________________________________________________ 
 In this paper I examine two of George Berkeley’s accounts regarding the existence 
of unperceived objects. Foremost, I provide a brief introduction to Berkeley’s 
metaphysical position. Following from that I present Berkeley’s two accounts: the 
counterfactual account, which states that an unperceived object exists if it were to be 
perceived in some possible circumstance, and the divine account, which states that God 
perceives all objects, accounting for those left unperceived by finite minds. After an 
examination of the two tenets I will conclude that the counterfactual account is the more 
compelling one in light of Berkeley’s overall metaphysical position.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Berkeley’s metaphysical theses consist of idealism and immaterialism. As an 
idealist Berkeley posited minds and mind-dependent states (such as ideas) as the most 
fundamental entities to existence, and as an immaterialist he held the view that matter 
understood as a mind-independent substance to be a contradiction. Material objects 
according to Berkeley are merely collections of ideas: “...a certain colour, taste, smell, 
figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct 
thing, signified by the name apple” (Principles, I §1). Fundamental to Berkeley’s 
ontological stance is his Esse est Percipi thesis: ‘To be is to be perceived’. Since objects 
merely amount to collections of ideas, it follows that for an object to exist, it must be 
perceived by some mind. However this claim seems to challenge our common sense 
beliefs regarding unperceived objects — we assume that objects can go on existing 
unperceived, and it seems to be the case that they remain in the same place after a period 
of not perceiving them, for instance. In the following sections I will present Berkeley’s 
accounts of unperceived objects.  
 In Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley provides a counterfactual account 
concerning the existence of unperceived objects: “The table I write on, I say, exists, that 
is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby 
that if I was in my study I might perceive it...” (Principles, I §3). Berkeley’s claim here is 
that unperceived objects exist if they are perceived in certain circumstances; for Berkeley 
to state that the table exists in his unoccupied study is to say that he would perceive it 
were he to enter his study. To consider another example, we may conceive of a case in 
which I have placed a pair of shoes inside my unoccupied closet and shut the closet door. 
For one to state that these unperceived shoes exist is to say that he would perceive them 
were he to enter my closet.  
2 However, this counterfactual account of unperceived objects in conjunction with 
Berkeley’s Esse est Percipi thesis, ‘to be is to be perceived’, seems to imply that objects 
pop in and out of existence, or that they are constantly created and annihilated. If it is true 
for an object that Esse est Percipi, and also that an unperceived object exists as long as it 
is perceived in some possible circumstance, then it simply is the case that objects cannot 
exist unperceived. Thus accordingly, while the shoes in my closet exist if there is a mind 
perceiving them, they also fail to exist at the moment when there is not any mind 
perceiving them.  
 While the counterfactual account is left with the bizarre consequence of objects 
constantly popping in and out of existence, this absurdity may be mitigated to an extent 
when compared to a similar implication of indirect materialism: “It is thought strangely 
absurd that upon closing my eyelids, all the visible objects round me should be reduced to 
nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree 
on all hands, that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of 
sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived?” (Principles, I 
§46). Akin to the counterfactual account of unperceived objects, the indirect materialists 
also posit that the existence of the immediate objects of perception, such as light and 
colours, depend upon a mind’s perception of them. Berkeley also draws a comparison 
between his account and Malebranche’s occasionalism: “For the schoolmen, though they 
acknowledge the existence of matter, and that the while mundane fabrick is framed out of 
it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist with the divine conservation, which 
by them is expounded to be a continual creation” (Principles, I §46). Analogous to 
Berkeley’s counterfactual account, Malebranche’s occasionalism also posits that matter is 
constantly being created and annihilated. Thus it seems that Berkeley’s counterfactual 
account shares a similar theme with other competing doctrines in their explanations 
regarding the existence of unperceived objects. However, the counterfactual account is 
still arguably more incredible than the others, either by the sheer amount of objects that 
are subject to mind-dependence — all objects are mind-dependent on Berkeley’s account 
whereas the only objects that are subject to this on the indirect materialist’s account 
consist of the immediate objects of perception — or because it is simply more plausible 
to attribute the process of the constant creation and annihilation of objects to an 
omnipotent mind, God’s, rather than to finite minds. Berkeley’s divine account of 
unperceived objects, however, seems to directly address this issue.  
 According to the divine account of unperceived objects, whatever is left 
unperceived by finite minds is accounted for by God’s all-encompassing perception: 
“[Objects] have an existence exterior to the mind, since I find them by experience to be 
independent of it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist...there is an 
omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to 
our view in such a manner...” (Three Dialogues, p.173). Thus there is no object that is 
actually unperceived. The divine account of unperceived objects, unlike the  
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constantly pop in and out of existence based upon their being perceived or unperceived 
by finite perceivers since all objects are continually perceived by God. Through the 
divine account Berkeley’s idealist picture of the world is now made consistent with our 
common sense intuitions regarding the existence of objects left unperceived. Thus if Esse 
est Percipi, then the shoes that I have placed in my unoccupied closet exist because God 
is perceiving them.  
 While the divine account of unperceived objects can deal with the unfavourable 
consequence of the counterfactual account, it is not without its own set of complications. 
But before I establish one particular objection, it should foremost be considered that if the 
continued existence of finitely unperceived objects are accounted for by God, then it 
seems that the ideas that God perceives must be either identical to or resemble the ideas 
that we perceive. For example, consider a case in which I perceive a particular pair of 
shoes — God can be said to be doing the same as well. If I were to place these shoes in 
my unoccupied closet and close the closet doors it would be the case that God would still 
be perceiving them. Later on I can open the closet and perceive the shoes: if Esse est 
Percipi then they have remained in continuous existence through God’s perception of 
them. At this point it is tentative as to whether God and I are are perceiving the same, 
numerically identical shoe-idea, as ideas are typically understood to be subjective in their 
content, but it seems plausible that the relation between my shoe-idea and God’s is at 
least one of resemblance.  
 Now an objection can be raised to the divine account, of which I shall call the pain 
objection, by way of textual evidence that seems to indicate that God’s ideas can neither 
be identical to nor resemble certain ideas that we perceive. In the Three Dialogues 
Philonous, Berkeley’s fictional mouthpiece, states that God cannot perceive the idea of 
pain: “God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can 
Himself suffer pain, I positively deny...such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor be 
affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all” (Three Dialogues, p. 
184). Additionally, Philonous states that when a hand is brought before a fire only one 
simple sensation will be experienced: “Seeing therefore that [intense heat and pain] are 
both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one 
simple, or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense 
heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and consequently, that the intense heat 
immediately perceived, is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain” (Three 
Dialogues, p.113). Therefore, an intense heat is numerically identical to a particular sort 
of pain. And if it is the case that an intense heat is numerically identical to a particular 
sort of pain, and it is also a fact of the matter that God cannot perceive pain, then it seems 
to follow that God cannot perceive intense heat. Yet it seems that God does perceive 
intense-heat: if objects are to be understood as collections of ideas, and if Esse est 
Percipi, then it must be the case that God perceives finitely unperceived celestial bodies,  
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doing so God perceives pain, which is a manifest contradiction within Berkeley’s system.  
 However, there might be a way to escape the pain objection: God may perceive 
ideas in a manner that is fundamentally different from how we perceive them. In 
Principles of Human Knowledge I §1 Berkeley categorizes ideas as belonging to the three 
classes of either sensations, reflections, or those of memory and imagination. Sensations 
are felt through the sense-perceptions of our relevant sense-organs, reflections consist of 
internal, self-originating emotions, and ideas belonging to memory and imagination 
involve “...either compounding, dividing, or barely representing [ideas] originally 
perceived in the aforesaid ways” (Principles, I §1). Thus the ideas we perceive when we 
are said to perceive objects belong to the category of sensations, and the same can be said 
of the pains and pleasures that we experience: we visually observe objects and feel bodily 
pains and pleasures via our sense-perceptions. However, as Philonous states, “[God] can 
suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at  
all” (Three Dialogues, p.184). According to the text, God utterly lacks the ability to 
perceive ideas as sensations. But as noted earlier, God perceives all objects, some of 
which contain within them ideas such as the intense heat-idea, which is numerically 
identical to a particular sort of pain. And if the ideas such as the intense heat-idea cannot 
be perceived by God because God cannot be said to be affected with any sensation, but 
yet these intense heat-idea bearing objects still exist finitely unperceived, then it seems 
plausible that God may perceive the ideas that we perceive as sensations in another 
manner: as ideas of the imagination. To illustrate the efficacy of this claim we can 
consider imagining an intense heat — we may picture ourselves trapped within a burning 
furnace, for instance. And through this process of imagining all the agony of the situation 
it is the case that we do not feel any relevant sensation at all; it seems that the same can 
be said of God when he imagines intense heat-idea bearing objects. Thus while we 
perceive pains, pleasures, or intense heats as sensations, God perceives all these ideas 
through his imagination, avoiding any sensation entirely. Therefore through positing that 
God perceives the ideas that we perceive as sensations as ideas belonging to the 
imagination the divine account of unperceived objects avoids the pain objection.  
 So far I have established Berkeley’s two accounts of unperceived objects, which 
consist of the counterfactual account and the divine account. I will argue in the next 
section that the counterfactual account is the more plausible of the two.  
 Berkeley’s counterfactual account of unperceived objects seems more viable of the 
two for a variety of reasons. Foremost, this account does not depend upon the 
metaphysical existence of a supernatural being, or God. The counterfactual account 
succeeds in establishing an analysis of unperceived objects without resorting to such a 
divine entity: to say that some object exists unperceived is to make a statement about 
what would be perceived were certain circumstances fulfilled. Furthermore, in light of the 
counterfactual account the divine account seems ad hoc; disregarding Berkeley’s own  
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an entity that was needed to be posited until the counterfactual account was challenged 
with its consequence of having objects be subject to a constant process of creation and 
annihilation when it was paired with his Esse est Percipi thesis. Additionally, the 
unintuitive result of the counterfactual account does not condemn it to being a false 
theory; our intuitions, while they may be used as general guidelines, are imperfect and 
have been proven wrong in many cases. Finally, even though the divine account solved 
the problem of the counterfactual account, the positing of God naturally leads to more 
questions and complications. For instance, how can Berkeley explain our idea of God? To 
this Berkeley explicitly states that we cannot have ideas of minds or spirits, thus nor of 
God: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit: for all ideas whatever, being 
passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which 
acts” (Principles, I §27). So according to Berkeley, we do not have ideas of minds or 
spirits because ideas are passive and minds are active. However, Berkeley introduces a 
new term, ‘notion’ — instead of having ideas of spirits, we have notions of them: “We 
may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active 
beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas” (Principles, I §89). Thus notions are a 
kind of mental state distinct from ideas, in which we come to know of minds and spirits. 
However this concept of notions seems mysterious and almost irrelevant in the face of the 
rest of Berkeley’s idealism. Therefore after weighing Berkeley’s two accounts of 
unperceived objects I endorse that the counterfactual account is more compelling in light 
of Berkeley’s overall metaphysical position.  
 In conclusion I have examined two of Berkeley’s tenets regarding the existence of 
unperceived objects which consist of the counterfactual account and the divine account. 
In consideration of his idealism and immaterialism, I advocate that Berkeley’s 
counterfactual account is the more credible of the two.  
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